ISAGREEMENTS about die conduct of monetary policy have traditionally cen-■ tred on the relative importance of its goals and die best means of achieving JH J diem. Today, central bankers everywhere treat inflation control as the main objective of monetary policy, but retain considerable discretionary powers while oper ating with varying degrees of independence from governments. But do central banks know more about an economy's fundamentals than the financial markets, which act, direcdy or indirectly, on behalf of all agents in the economy?
Since Australia's exchange rate was floated, the Reserve Bank alters the stance of monetary policy by focusing on interest rates through the so-called cash rate. T he cash rate is set for the purpose of influencing other interest rates, particularly longer-term rates. Thus, the linkage between short-and long-term interest rates plays a major role in the transmission of changes in the stance of monetary policy to the real economy.
Changes in interest rates are thought to have an impact on the spending patterns of households and firms through liquidity, wealth, exchange rate and expectations channels. For instance, higher interest rates can curb firms' investment expenditure (as witnessed in Australia during the last great policy induced recession of the early 1990s) because the cost of capital rises relative to its productivity. Higher interest rates are also likely to reduce equity values, as investors switch from shares to bonds, thus lowering the market value of firms' capital relative to its replacement cost According to standard theory, this further weakens the incentive for firms to invest.
Moreover, to the extent that lower equity values depress aggregate household wealth, consumption spending may also be reduced. For monetary policy to operate effectively along diese lines, it is important diat interest rates at the short end of die spectrum influence rates at the long end, since investment spending in particular is likely to be more sensidve to longer-term interest rate movements, given business planning horizons. The interreladonship between monetary policy, interest rates and die economy is shown schemadcally in T he behaviour of the targeted cash market rate, and of indicative short-term and long-term interest rates over recent years, is depicted in Figure 2 . W hat is evident is the close relationship between the cash rate and short-term (such as the 90-day bank bill) rates. There is also evidence of substantial co-movement between short-term and long-term rates, though long-term rates have been persistently higher.
International arbitrage ties long-term rates to foreign long-term rates, with any dif ference between domestic and foreign interest rates likely to arise from the markets' expectation of future exchange rate changes according to the standard uncovered in terest parity condition. For instance, the gaps between similar long term rates in Aus tralia and overseas rates can reflect market expectations of future exchange rate movements, as well as liquidity and risk premia which vary over time. 
Monetary Policy and the Yield Curve
At any given time, the so-called yield curve describes interest rates on securities which are ostensibly the same except for their terms to maturity. For instance, an ascending, or positive, yield curve shows that, for any given time interval, short-term rates on, say, five-week Treasury Notes are lower than on longer-term rates on, say, 26-week Treas ury Notes. Descending or inverse yield curves convey the opposite (Figure 3 ). They can also be flat or hump-backed and the slope and position of the yield curve can vary from period to period.
The yield curve itself can be used as an indicator of expected macroeconomic conditions, particularly when comparing short-run interest rates and rates at die long end of the spectrum. For instance, long-term rates will reflect expectations of the in flationary effect of current monetary policy. There will therefore be some offset to the linkage between long-term rates and officially set short-term rates to the extent that a deflationary' monetary policy which raises short-term rates also lowers the markets' expectation of future inflation. The longer the maturity structure, the more important this offset is likely to be. Various theories have been expounded over the years to explain why short-term and long-term market interest rates differ. The three main explanations of the term structure of interest rates that have been advanced are: the expectations theory; flic risk (or liquidity preference) approach; and the segmented markets theory. O f these, the expectations theory is the most widely accepted. It presumes that investors regard default-free securities, like Treasury Notes, which are issued by the same entity but which differ with respect to their terms to maturity, as perfect substitutes. Accordingly, the interest rate paid on the longer-term security -say, a hypothetical 60 day Treas ury Note -equals the average of flic current rate on a hypothetical 30 day Treasury Note and the markets' expectations of the rate to be paid on 30 day Treasury Notes in a month's time.
In formula terms, the expectations hypothesis suggests that: 60 day rate = 0.5 (30 day rate + next month's expected 30 day rate) is + ic Or, more generally, i. = -------2 where i2t is die longer term rate, i* is die current, or spot, short term rate and is the short tenn rate expected in the next period.
For example: if the spot interest rate on a 30-day Treasury Note is 5 per cent and die market expects diat die interest rate on a 30-day Treasury Note next mondi to be 7 per cent, dien, according to diis dieory, die spot interest rate on a 60-day Note would be 6 per cent. It follows diat an ascending yield curve depicting die short rate at 5 per cent and die long rate at 6 per cent contains informadon about die money mar ket's expectadon of die future short-term rate. In odier words, diis approach suggests diat it is market opinion about future short-term rates which drives longer-term rates. The accepted corollary for monetary policy is diat long-term interest rates can be changed by fixing the official short-term rate for sustained periods, since money and bond markets will base dieir expectations of future short-term rates on the current official rate.
The risk (or liquidity preference) dieory of die tenn stnicture is effectively an augmented version of die expectations hypodiesis. It suggests diat investors consider short-term securities to be more attractive dian longer-term bonds due to uncertainty about future short-term rates and that, accordingly, a premium is required on longertenn securities to make diem as attractive to investors as short-term securities. The longer the maturity, it is argued, die higher diis premium will be.
T he segmented markets dieory of die term structure is diametrically opposed to die expectations dieory because it presumes diat securities of different maturities is sued by die same entity are completely non-substitutable. Accordingly, die slope of die yield curve results from die interaction of die demand and supply of securities in distinct, or separate, markets. In odier words, no linkage exists between officially con trolled short-term interest rates and longer-term rates.
The corollary for monetary policy here is diat targeting short-term rates is largely ineffective in influencing long-rate-scnsitive investment spending and macroeconomic activity. Instead, die dieory implies diat central banks should intervene in longer-term securities markets in order direedy to influence long-term interest rates. However, diis approach has few supporters and litde empirical support.
Using Market Expectations to Set Interest Rates
Previous studies of die relationship between monetary policy and die yield curve have eidier focused on die yield curve itself as an indicator of future inflation and macro economic activity, or have empirically tested die validity of die expectations hypothesis to establish whether discretionary monetary policy can in practice influence longer-.
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term interest rates. It is proposed here that the central bank regularly set the cash rate according to a rule which is based on the expectations hypothesis and uses information contained in the yield curve itself. The procedure whereby the cash rate is inferred from the yield curve can be illustrated by reference to the hypothetical data in "Fable 1. The cash rate which the central bank sets by intervening in the money market is fixed at the same level as the short-term market rate shown in the first column. The second column records a relatively longer rate which reflects the market's expectation of the future cash and short-term rates. For instance, if die cash rate is 5 per cent and the longer rate is observed to be 6 per cent, it follows from the expectations hypothesis of die term structure outlined above that the markets expect the future cash rate will be 7 per cent. That is, from die earlier equation summarising die expectations hy pothesis, the expected future short-term rate is simply related to the current short-term rate and die longer rate in die following way:
In diis particular example, die cash rate can be automatically reset by the central bank every 30 days. Yet it would also be possible for the central bank automatically to peg the cash rate more frequently, for instance as regularly as every day, using a mov ing average of implicit expected rates, calculated using a designated security, such as Treasury Notes. The money and bond markets could then express their collective view about die appropriate stance of monetary policy by focusing on trade in that par ticular security, thereby determining the rate to be calibrated daily by officials. In ef fect, all domestic interest rates would then be market-determined.
The Exchange Rate
Questions may arise as to where die exchange rate fits into this proposal, since, in ad dition to interest rates, the exchange rate is taken into account by (for example) die Canadian and New Zealand central banks when assessing monetary conditions. However, under the prevailing floating exchange rate system, the central bank, by definition, should allow the exchange rate to find its own equilibrium level according to die play of demand and supply in die foreign-exchange market itself. Hence there is no explicit need to factor die exchange rate into the proposed interest-rate rule (though rule-based changes in cash rates reladve to foreign interest rates may still influ ence exchange-rate movements and hence real acdvity, as suggested earlier in Figure   1 ).
Inflation
W here would such a rule leave die low-infladon objecdve of monetary policy? It is a fundamental axiom of monetary economics that central banks which ultimately have monopoly control over the issue of die domestic currency cannot simultaneously set interest rates and the money supply at pre-dctermined levels. Targeting die money supply for given money demand implies diat the interest rate becomes endogenous, whereas targeting die interest rate for the same money demand implies diat the money supply becomes endogenous. Hence die money supply must always adjust in re sponse to die central bank's interest targeting activity.
Accordingly, if die central bank striedy adhered to the proposed interest-rate rule, dien die money markets would also indireedy govern the rate of domestic money growth and so ultimately decide die rate of inflation over the longer term. This may suggest diat die interest rate rule could lead to higher inflation. But such an outcome seems unlikely in view of die strong aversion to inflation that money and bond mar kets have demonstrated in die past Financial markets now react quickly to news of higher inflation by immediately pushing up interest rates. Under die proposed rule, die financial sector itself would diereby automatically induce higher cash rates, and hence automatically check domestic money supply growdi, which is die ultimate de terminant of inflation.
Conclusion
The current practice of discretionary interest-rate setting by central banks is clearly a major cause of uncertainty in financial markets about die future course of short-term interest rates. The Reserve Bank of Australia's discretion in periodically changing cash rates is likely to explain part of die persistent, diough time-varying, premium on Australia's long-term interest rates.
O f die several rules diat have been proposed to replace central banks' discretion over interest rates, probably die best known is die money growdi rule derived from die monetarist doctrine dial growdi of die money supply is die key determinant of inflation. Yet diis rule, diough aimed at nullifying die potentially debilitating effects of central bank discretion, presumed superior information on die part of the audiorities to the extent diat die stipulated money growth rule had to be premised on the central bank's forecasts of future economy-wide activity.
The alternative rule proposed here recognises diat policy-makers are likely to know less about die behaviour of die economy at large dian is known collectively by the financial sector, operating on behalf of resident households and Finns transacting in domestic and international markets. Since interest rates of varying yields are proximately determined by the money and bond markets, it follows that the informa tion held by these markets about economic fundamentals should be used as a basis for setting official interest rates. Financial markets would dien effectively determine interest rates, consistent with die way diey set the value o f die currency under a float ing exchange rate regime.
